Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Introspection and Consciousness$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744794

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 07 December 2021

Knowledge of Perception

Knowledge of Perception

(p.65) 3 Knowledge of Perception
Introspection and Consciousness

Daniel Stoljar

Oxford University Press

According to Fred Dretske’ evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these things, something is wrong with the evidence argument. What? I suggest that the argument overlooks a distinction between evidential and explanatory readings of its key phrases. However, I also suggest that in order to defend this diagnosis, one must acknowledge a significant element of rationality in the relevant notion of explanation. This chapter closes by comparing my proposal with an alternative.

Keywords:   knowledge, evidence, perception, introspection, self-knowledge, Dretske

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .