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RetributivismEssays on Theory and Policy$
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Mark D. White

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199752232

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199752232.001.0001

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Retributive Justice and Social Cooperation

Retributive Justice and Social Cooperation

(p.73) 4 Retributive Justice and Social Cooperation

Gerald Gaus (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Based on experiments in social evolution theory and game theory, this chapter argues two points: (a) the success of social groups depends on having punishers, and (b) punishers are supplying a public good, since those who cooperate but do not punish outperform those who cooperate and do punish. If we were simply forward-looking in our reasoning, as in the simple instrumental theory of rationality—if all payoffs are either current or anticipated, and not tied to past action—social cooperation would be a mystery. The chapter shows that for societies to thrive in the presence of noncooperative “free riders,” it needs some members who are motivated to punish the free riders without instrumental justification—that is, as a matter of (evolved) sentiment or instinct rather than calculated, rational, utility-maximizing action. This, according to the chapter, accounts for both the existence of retributive “tastes” as well as their importance to social cooperation.

Keywords:   retributivism, punishment, justice, social evolution, game theory, sentiment, rationality, social theory, cooperation

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