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Kant’s Thinker$
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Patricia Kitcher

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199754823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001

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The Normativity Objection

The Normativity Objection

(p.217) 13 The Normativity Objection
Kant’s Thinker

Patricia Kitcher (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers another venerable objection to Kant’s theory of cognition: it is guilty of psychologism. The chapter defends the theory by showing that it can account for the normativity of cognition and, further, that the use of cognitive norms requires Kantian apperception. In a brief appendix, I contrast my interpretation of Kant’s views on concept formation with those of Béatrice Longuenesse.

Keywords:   normativity, psychologism, concept formation, Béatrice Longuenesse

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