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Does Perception Have Content?$
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Berit Brogaard

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199756018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 September 2021

Introduction

Introduction

Does Perception Have Content?

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction
Source:
Does Perception Have Content?
Author(s):

Berit Brogaard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0001

This chapter explores the connection between the volume’s remaining fourteen contributions. One of the main observations made along the way is that debates about whether perceptual experience has content cannot be resolved independently of addressing the question of what the constituents of content would be, if perceptual experience did have content. It is also argued that the view that perception has content in a minimal sense, together with uncontroversial assumptions, entails that perception has content in a strong sense.

Keywords:   affordances, disjunctivism, content view, high-level properties, intentionality, naive realism, perceptual content, phenomenal character, representationalism, visual experience, visual seemings, weak and strong content

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