Does Perception Have Content?
This chapter explores the connection between the volume’s remaining fourteen contributions. One of the main observations made along the way is that debates about whether perceptual experience has content cannot be resolved independently of addressing the question of what the constituents of content would be, if perceptual experience did have content. It is also argued that the view that perception has content in a minimal sense, together with uncontroversial assumptions, entails that perception has content in a strong sense.
Keywords: affordances, disjunctivism, content view, high-level properties, intentionality, naive realism, perceptual content, phenomenal character, representationalism, visual experience, visual seemings, weak and strong content
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