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Does Perception Have Content?$
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Berit Brogaard

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199756018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 September 2021

Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities

Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities

The Quixotic Case of Color

Chapter:
(p.329) 14 Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities
Source:
Does Perception Have Content?
Author(s):

Terry Horgan

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0014

This chapter sets forth and defends a position concerning the content of visual color-experiences, the content of color-attributing judgments, and the metaphysics of color. Color experiences have systematically non-veridical content: they present external objects as instantiating properties that those objects never instantiate. Color-attributing judgments, however, are often veridical: they attribute to external objects not the properties that are presented in visual color experiences, but rather certain Lockean dispositions to produce such colof-experiences—and these dispositional properties are often instantiated by the objects to which they are attributed. On the basis of this account, the chapter proposes a general distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. Presentational primary qualities are often instantiated and are identical to the corresponding judgmental primary qualities. Presentational secondary qualities, however, are never instantiated; nonetheless, judgmental secondary properties often are instantiated, and they are Lockean dispositions to produce experiences as-of the instantiation of those presentational secondary properties.

Keywords:   color, color experience, phenomenal intentionality, presentational content, judgmental content, primary quality, secondary quality, Edenic property

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