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Does Perception Have Content?$
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Berit Brogaard

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199756018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 September 2021

Looks, Reasons, and Experiences

Looks, Reasons, and Experiences

Chapter:
(p.76) 4 Looks, Reasons, and Experiences
Source:
Does Perception Have Content?
Author(s):

Kathrin Glüer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0004

According to the phenomenal belief account, perceptual experiences are a kind of belief. They have contents of a certain form: They ascribe ‘phenomenal’ properties to ordinary material objects, properties such as looking red or looking round. Such an account can easily accommodate the epistemic role of experience as a provider of defeasible reasons for (further) empirical belief—a central part of our pre-theoretic conception of experience. This chapter further develops this account by arguing, first, that there is a use of ‘looks’, the so-called phenomenal use, that is best interpreted as capturing part of the propositional content of experience—not as an attitude-operator used for reporting the attitude taken toward that content. And second, it argues that the intuitive inferential integration of experience into our system of beliefs provides one of the strongest motivations for construing experiences as having propositional content in the first place.

Keywords:   perceptual experience, belief theory, perceptual belief, looks, looks reports

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