Containing essays published in various journals, this book covers a range of topics, notably political philosophy, legal philosophy, standards of legal interpretation, sensible legal approaches to criminal law, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Essays address whether public reason is a necessary basis for law; the extent to which religious convictions may figure in law-making; the persuasiveness of natural law and its relation to public reason; what distinguishes legal positivism from competing theories; discerning the “rule of recognition” and its significance; how far should laws e ... More

Containing essays published in various journals, this book covers a range of topics, notably political philosophy, legal philosophy, standards of legal interpretation, sensible legal approaches to criminal law, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Essays address whether public reason is a necessary basis for law; the extent to which religious convictions may figure in law-making; the persuasiveness of natural law and its relation to public reason; what distinguishes legal positivism from competing theories; discerning the “rule of recognition” and its significance; how far should laws enforce moral norms; when claims of conscience may warrant exemptions from legal duties; why we should observe legal duties; the bases for criminal punishment; the underlying justifications for freedom of speech; how far insults and epithets qualify; what questions judges should address when they consider religious claims; and whether “equality” is or is not an “empty” concept. Readers interested in particular questions may look at those chapters; but a common theme is captured by the book title. We should resist the idea that abstract categorization can really resolve difficult practical questions about how people should act and what the law should provide. The essays suggest nuances and subtleties in many concepts, and the relevance of a range of considerations, which usually obviate simple, far-reaching answers and often reveal why the right course of action is genuinely contestable. Both individual and communal experience are important. Even among liberal democracies, differences in history, culture, and structures of government affect how officials and citizens should be guided.