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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality

Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality

In Defense of a Kantian Account

(p.116) 7 Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality
Phenomenal Intentionality

Farid Masrour

Oxford University Press

Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. Phenomenal objectivity distinguishes perceptual experience from those types of experience, e.g., mood experiences, that have the phenomenal character of presenting to one only the states of one’s own mind. An account of phenomenal objectivity would be useful to believers in phenomenal intentionality—a form of intentionality that is constituted by phenomenality. This chapter proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity.

Keywords:   consciousness, intentionality, representation, phenomenology, phenomenal objectivity, phenomenal intentionality, constancies, Kant

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