Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Phenomenal Intentionality$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 December 2020

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects

Chapter:
(p.137) 8 Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

Frederick Kroon

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0008

This chapter attempts to adjudicate the disagreement between familiar realist ways of understanding intentionality and the anti-realist way favored by phenomenal intentionalists. It begins this task by presenting what seems a particularly strong reason for thinking that phenomenal intentionalists have underestimated the need for intentional objects in an account of the intentional content of sensory experience. After arguing that we should nonetheless question the intentional realist's account of this intentional content, the chapter offers a compromise fictionalist approach that fits the spirit of the phenomenal intentionalist framework while retaining the benefits of the intentional realist's way of invoking intentional objects.

Keywords:   phenomenal intentionality, intentional objects, nonexistence, Husserl, phenomenal content, representational content, fictionalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .