Inclusivism about Truth
Inclusivism about Truth
Various interpretations of inclusivism about truth are considered. The salient considerations include the judgment that others may be right about beliefs we do not hold and being open to learning from others. Various ways of distinguishing closed and open inclusivism are considered, as are proposals from J. A. DiNoia and Paul Griffiths, among others.
Keywords: inclusivism, inclusivism about truth, closed inclusivism, open inclusivism, J. A. DiNoia, Paul Griffiths
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