The Moral Foundation
The Moral Foundation
This chapter distinguishes between duty-based moral restraint and duty-based moral advocacy. Duty-based moral advocacy is shown to be inefficient and to undermine duty-based moral restraint. The moral foundation is therefore neither fully consequentialist nor nonconsequentialist in its approach to moral reasoning, but requires that negative moral actions be governed by a nonconsequentialist approach, while positive moral actions are government by a consequentialist approach. If an individual possesses moral beliefs that comport with the moral foundation, then the greater his level of conviction, the larger the set of transactions over which he will be regarded by others as being trustworthy. The moral foundation is compared to earlier work by prominent religious leaders, moral philosophers, political theorists, and economists. Potential problems are then addressed.
Keywords: consequentialism, duty-based moral advocacy, duty-based moral restraint, moral conviction, nonconsequentialism, trustworthy
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