Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Theology of Jonathan Edwards$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199791606

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791606.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 December 2020

Free Will and Original Sin

Free Will and Original Sin

Chapter:
(p.339) 22 Free Will and Original Sin
Source:
The Theology of Jonathan Edwards
Author(s):

Michael J. McClymond

Gerald R. McDermott

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791606.003.0022

Jonathan Edwards thought a misunderstanding of the human will was at the root of nearly all that had gone wrong in theology. Often dissatisfied with existing boundaries, he paid tribute in Freedom of the Will to intellectualists on the will by stipulating that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding, which “is as the greatest apparent good is.” He concluded that there is no true freedom of the will when the will is indifferent or self-determined without influence or motive. In Original Sin he attempted two things: to establish universal depravity and to demonstrate the fact and justice of the imputation of Adam's sin. The end of the chapter considers philosophical objections to Edwards's occasionalism, and the charge that he strayed far from Calvin on the authorship of Adam's sin.

Keywords:   free will, indifference, determinism, imputation, Adam's sin, occasionalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .