Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Hard FeelingsThe Moral Psychology of Contempt$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Macalester Bell

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199794140

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794140.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 02 March 2021

Contempt as a Fitting Globalist Emotion

Contempt as a Fitting Globalist Emotion

Chapter:
(p.64) Chapter 2 Contempt as a Fitting Globalist Emotion
Source:
Hard Feelings
Author(s):

Macalester Bell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794140.003.0003

This chapter considers the objection that contempt can never fit its target and should for this reason be dismissed. One distinguishing feature of contempt is its globalism: contempt presents its target as low as a person and takes the whole person as its object. Some critics insist this globalism renders all tokens of contempt unfitting and inapt. Against this, it is argued that this objection mischaracterizes the person-assessments at the heart of contempt. Contempt can be a fitting response to persons. The argument for this conclusion raises a problem for fitting attitude theories of value: fittingness cannot do the work that many metaethical theories demand.

Keywords:   fittingness, fitting attitude, theories of value, globalist emotions, relationships, John Doris

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .