The Moral Value of Contempt
The Moral Value of Contempt
This chapter offers a defense of contempt’s moral value. When its aptness conditions are satisfied, contempt may be the best response to the vices of superiority, and it has both instrumental and noninstrumental moral value. Despite what some have argued, contempt is not precluded by the respect we owe all persons; an ethic of contempt is compatible with an ethic of respect.
Keywords: respect, Kant, Aristotle, Nietzsche, social virtues, comparisons, disrespect, withdrawal, moral address
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