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Hard FeelingsThe Moral Psychology of Contempt$
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Macalester Bell

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199794140

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794140.001.0001

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The Moral Value of Contempt

The Moral Value of Contempt

Chapter:
(p.137) Chapter 4 The Moral Value of Contempt
Source:
Hard Feelings
Author(s):

Macalester Bell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794140.003.0005

This chapter offers a defense of contempt’s moral value. When its aptness conditions are satisfied, contempt may be the best response to the vices of superiority, and it has both instrumental and noninstrumental moral value. Despite what some have argued, contempt is not precluded by the respect we owe all persons; an ethic of contempt is compatible with an ethic of respect.

Keywords:   respect, Kant, Aristotle, Nietzsche, social virtues, comparisons, disrespect, withdrawal, moral address

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