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Freedom and ReflectionHegel and the Logic of Agency$
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Christopher Yeomans

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199794522

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.001.0001

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The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation

(p.118) 5 The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation
Freedom and Reflection

Christopher Yeomans

Oxford University Press

This chapter applies the results of chapter 4 to the problem raised in chapter 3. That is, it shows how the conception of explanation Hegel articulates in his Logic eliminates the infinite regresses that had seemed to plague the notion of self-determination or substantive free will. It focuses on the versions of the regress argument presented, in different ways, by Galen Strawson and G.E.M. Anscombe. The similarities between Hegel's view and Robert Nozick's conception of self-subsumption are then investigated in the light of arguments in the contemporary philosophy of action and Kant's Third Antinomy.

Keywords:   Hegel, free will, Galen Strawson, G.E.M. Anscombe, Kant, infinite regress arguments

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