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Freedom and ReflectionHegel and the Logic of Agency$
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Christopher Yeomans

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199794522

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.001.0001

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Agency as True Necessity

Agency as True Necessity

(p.167) 8 Agency as True Necessity
Freedom and Reflection

Christopher Yeomans

Oxford University Press

This chapter applies the results of chapter 7 (i.e., the reconstruction of Hegel's theory of modality) to the problem of chapter 6 (i.e., the modal concern that agency requires alternate possibilities yet the explicability of the world requires the necessitation of events). Specifically, it argues that Hegel's understanding of the relation between Willkür or the liberty of indifference and Wille or true free will can be understood in terms of the difference between relative and absolute modality, such that the alternate possibilities of the former can be understood to be preserved in the latter in virtue of the self-constituting function of true free will in constituting its own conditions. This is then applied to an interpretation of Hegel's most structurally basic presentation of the free will in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right.

Keywords:   Hegel, free will, Willkür, liberty of indifference, alternate possibilities, necessity, Philosophy of Right

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