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Can Animals Be Moral?$
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Mark Rowlands

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199842001

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

Moral Agents, Patients, and Subjects

Moral Agents, Patients, and Subjects

Chapter:
(p.71) 3 Moral Agents, Patients, and Subjects
Source:
Can Animals Be Moral?
Author(s):

Mark Rowlands

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0003

The novel category of a moral subject—an individual who is a subject of moral motivation but who cannot be held responsible for what she does—is introduced in this chapter, and distinguished from the familiar categories of moral agent and moral patient. Reasons are identified for thinking that the category of moral subject collapses into that of moral agent: that is, that there can be no moral motivation without moral agency. The central argument of the book is identified: the category of moral subject is a legitimate one that does not collapse into that of a moral agent. Animals are moral subjects, but not moral agents.

Keywords:   agent, patient, subject, motivation, responsibility, agency

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