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Can Animals Be Moral?$
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Mark Rowlands

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199842001

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

The Idiot

The Idiot

(p.124) 5 The Idiot
Can Animals Be Moral?

Mark Rowlands

Oxford University Press

The concept of control, identified in the arguments of Aristotle and Kant, is rendered more precise in this chapter. The central dialectical figure of Myshkin is introduced. Myshkin is an individual who seemingly performs good actions, and does so on the basis of good motivations. He is, however, unable to subject his motivations to critical moral scrutiny. He is compared with Marlow—a traditional moral agent. Effective critical scrutiny of motivations is identified as the feature that distinguishes Myshkin and Marlow.

Keywords:   critical scrutiny, practical wisdom, Hursthouse, internal versus external reasons, moral module

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