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Against Absolute Goodness$
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Richard Kraut

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199844463

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844463.001.0001

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Pleasure Reconsidered

Pleasure Reconsidered

Chapter 10 Pleasure Reconsidered
Against Absolute Goodness

Richard Kraut

Oxford University Press

Chapter 3 offered an argument designed to make it plausible that there should be a positive answer to the initial question of this book: Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? This chapter returns that argument and asks how convincing it is. It is argued that if a thing's absolute goodness is to count as a reason for valuing it, some convincing examples of things that are to be valued for that reason should be able to be found. So far none have been found.

Keywords:   good, absolute goodness, value, positive answer

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