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Against Absolute Goodness$
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Richard Kraut

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199844463

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844463.001.0001

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Goodness before and after Moore

Goodness before and after Moore

Chapter 2 Goodness before and after Moore
Against Absolute Goodness

Richard Kraut

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on Moore's conception of goodness. It discusses how Moore was not the first to assert or assume the existence of absolute goodness. Nor was he the last. The concept of absolute or impersonal value—“intrinsic value,” as it is often called—continues to be employed in much contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy.

Keywords:   absolute goodness, good, intrinsic value, Anglo-American moral philosophy

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