Silence and Institutional Prejudice
Silence and Institutional Prejudice
When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the color of their skin, they suffer a distinctive form of injustice—they are undermined as a knower. This kind of injustice, which I call testimonial injustice, is not only an ethical problem but also a political one, for citizens are not free unless they get a fair hearing when they try to contest wrongful treatment. I shall argue that not only individuals but also public institutions need to have the virtue of testimonial justice. If our police, our juries, our complaints panels lack that virtue, then some groups cannot contest. And if you can’t do that, you do not have political freedom.
Keywords: institutional virtue, institutional racism, joint commitment, silencing, epistemic injustice, political freedom, republicanism, contestation
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