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Truth by AnalysisGames, Names, and Philosophy$
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Colin McGinn

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199856145

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856145.001.0001

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Sufficiency and Circularity

Sufficiency and Circularity

Chapter:
(p.34) 3 Sufficiency and Circularity
Source:
Truth by Analysis
Author(s):

Colin McGinn

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856145.003.0003

The previous chapter rejected an influential argument from Wittgenstein purporting to show that some concepts lack necessary conditions. It also endorsed an analysis of the concept game that supplies both necessary and sufficient conditions. This chapter addresses the question of whether some concepts lack sufficient conditions.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, concepts, sufficient conditions, necessary conditions

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