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Categories of BeingEssays on Metaphysics and Logic$
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Leila Haaparanta and Heikki Koskinen

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199890576

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 January 2022

To Be and/or Not to Be

To Be and/or Not to Be

The Objects of Meinong and Husserl

(p.241) 11 To Be and/or Not to Be
Categories of Being

Peter Simons

David Bell

Oxford University Press

Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their variety, Husserl emphasized contents and their variety. Their theories agree on many salient issues both of phenomenology and ontology. Meinong, like Twardowski, upheld the objectuality of all intentional acts, and was therefore constrained to seek objects for acts lacking standard objects. Husserl by contrast rejects non-existents and explains the same phenomena by saying such lack objects but are phenomenologically indistinguishable from acts that have objects. This is modified by Husserl’s later theory of noemata on the one hand and Meinong’s recognition of the semantic role of incomplete auxiliary objects on the other. As a result, their theories materially converged. This chapter charts their principal convergences and disagreements and portrays them both as independent continuers of Brentano’s messianic drive to establish a scientific philosophy.

Keywords:   objectuality, formal ontology, intentionality, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, noemata

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