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MacrocognitionA Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality$
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Bryce Huebner

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199926275

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.001.0001

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A Plausible Foundation for Macrocognition

A Plausible Foundation for Macrocognition

(p.73) 4 A Plausible Foundation for Macrocognition

Bryce Huebner

Oxford University Press

This chapter articulates in detail a novel approach to collective mentality derived from commonly recognized explanatory practices in the cognitive and biological sciences. This account embraces a broadly mechanistic approach to mentality, that is grounded in the componential account of mental-representation articulated in the Chapter 3. It is argued that collective mental states supervene on the integrated activity of distributed cognitive systems, and that this yields a reductive explanation of collective mentality. It is shown that this does not warrant an eliminativist conclusion, but instead demonstrates a striking parallel to the architecture of an individual mind.

Keywords:   Componential explanation, Kludges, Object-oriented programming, Trading languages, Supervenience, Reduction

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