Collective Selves and Collective Personhood
Collective Selves and Collective Personhood
It is often implausible to hold groups accountable for their claims and actions; in most cases, it is individuals who must be held accountable for their role in collective action. In light of this fact, this chapter argues for the existence of a minimal type of collective cognition that does not require epistemic accountability. This yields a more scientifically plausible account of collective mentality than has previously been advanced, allows for a reconceptualization of claims about collective responsibility, and helps make it clear that collective beliefs and desires are likely to be exceedingly rare types of phenomena.
Keywords: Collective responsibility, Collective intentionality, Collective belief, Pushmi-Pullyu, Mental representation
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