Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemic AuthorityA Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199936472

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 January 2021

The Rejection of Epistemic Authority

The Rejection of Epistemic Authority

(p.4) 1 The Rejection of Epistemic Authority
Epistemic Authority

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Oxford University Press

This chapter investigates the historical sources of resistance to epistemic authority in the history of philosophy. The chapter focuses on the value of epistemic self-reliance and argues that a defense of self-reliance from Plato, Descartes, Locke, or Kant is problematic and probably based on a misreading of those philosophers. If epistemic self-reliance is a good, it is not because of the untrustworthiness of others or the demands of Kantian autonomy. This chapter is a prolegomenon to an extended argument against epistemic self-reliance in later chapters.

Keywords:   authority, egalitarianism, self-reliance, autonomy, Descartes, Locke, Plato, Kant

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .