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Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds$
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Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199981151

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199981151.001.0001

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Traffic Games

Traffic Games

(p.290) 11 Traffic Games
Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds

Daniel Friedman

Barry Sinervo

Oxford University Press

Chapter 11 analyzes congestion effects in road networks and in packet-switched communication networks. It focuses on Wardrop equilibrium, the appropriate version of Nash equilibrium for such networks. The analysis begins with the Braess paradox, where improving a link may actually increase overall congestion for a given set of drivers. The analysis includes results bounding the degree of inefficiency in equilibrium (“the price of anarchy”). One possible remedy is a Pigovian tax that can restore efficiency, even in the presence of a double marginalization-like problem arising from competition amongst profit-maximizing link-owners. The analysis exploits analogies to electrical circuits, particularly simple circuits that are Thevenin equivalent to more complex circuits.

Keywords:   Wardrop equilibrium, potential games, Braess paradox, price of anarchy, Pigovian taxes, double marginalization, electrical circuits, Thevenin equivalent

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