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Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds$
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Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199981151

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199981151.001.0001

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Evolution of Cooperation

Evolution of Cooperation

(p.336) 13 Evolution of Cooperation
Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds

Daniel Friedman

Barry Sinervo

Oxford University Press

This chapter opens with a simple diagram capturing the tension that all social creatures face between self interest and the social good. It then reviews two famous devices for alleviating the tension, Hamilton’s kin selection and Trivers’s bilateral reciprocity, and demonstrates their isomorphism. Next it reviews the “kaleidoscope” niches that our ancestors inhabited in Pleistocene times, emphasizing the intense selection for flexible forms of cooperation within stable groups of individuals. It then presents humans’ novel coping device, the moral system, which builds on but goes well beyond the earlier devices. It shows how the content of the moral code evolves on short timescales to adapt to novel environments, and concludes with a short discussion of new adaptations (e.g., egalitarian to hierarchical) to accommodate pastoral life styles 10 thousand years ago.

Keywords:   cooperation, mutualism, spite, vengeance, social dilemma, inclusive fitness, Hamilton’s rule, folk theorem, reciprocal altruism, indirect evolution

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