The ways in which social structures can modulate strategic interaction are explored in this chapter. It covers Bergstrom’s model of assortative matching and Hadamard products of payoff matrices and adjustment matrices that provide a unified description of sexual selection. This new approach covers the transmission across generations via memes and genes, with or without crossover and recombination, and includes an example of haploid sexual selection drawn from Fisherian runaway. The approach could be expanded to include diploid sexual systems, thus linking population genetic models with game theoretic models. The chapter ends with a presentation of the Price equation in analyzing group structure and includes a biological example of cooperation. The last section extends the Price equation to continuous time.
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