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The Nature of Moral ResponsibilityNew Essays$
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Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199998074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 May 2021

The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility

The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility

(p.65) 3 The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility
The Nature of Moral Responsibility

Gideon Rosen

Oxford University Press

A theory of moral responsibility should not just identify the conditions of moral responsibility; it should explain why those conditions are as they are. This chapter explores an account of responsibility that yields explanations of the desired sort. According to the Alethic View, for a person X to be morally responsible (praiseworthy or blameworthy) for an action A just is for the thoughts implicit in the moral reactive emotions to be true of X and A. These thoughts thus determine the basic conditions of moral responsibility.

Keywords:   Alethic view, blameworthiness, desert, moral responsibility, reactive emotion

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