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On What MattersVolume Two$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

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Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism

Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism

(p.263) 24 Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism
On What Matters

Samuel Scheffler

Oxford University Press

This chapter provides a philosophical discussion of Analytical Naturalism and Subjectivism. It first considers several types of metaethical view, namely: Semi-Cognitivism, Cognitivism, Nihilism, Non-Cognitivism, Non-Naturalist Cognitivism, Analytical Naturalism, and Non-Analytical Naturalism. It then argues that we ought to reject Non-Cognitivism and the two forms of Naturalism (Analytical Naturalism and Non-Analytical Naturalism). It also suggests that normativity is either an illusion, or involves irreducibly normative truths. If we used the words ‘reason’, ‘should’, and ‘ought’ in their internal senses, Subjectivism about Reasons would not be a substantive normative view, but a concealed tautology. The chapter concludes by discussing normative beliefs and the concept of internal reason.

Keywords:   normativity, Analytical Naturalism, Subjectivism, Semi-Cognitivism, Cognitivism, Nihilism, Non-Cognitivism, Non-Naturalist Cognitivism, Non-Analytical Naturalism, internal reason

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