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On What MattersVolume Two$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 November 2020

Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism

Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism

(p.378) 28 Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism
On What Matters

Samuel Scheffler

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism. According to Non-Cognitivists, normative claims are not intended to state facts, except perhaps in some minimal sense. Morality essentially involves certain kinds of desire, or other conative attitude. For Expressivists, such attitudes are expressed by moral claims. In his Argument for Non-Cognitivism, John Hume states that if moral convictions were beliefs, we might have moral convictions that did not motivate us. Since that is inconceivable, moral convictions cannot be beliefs, but must be desires or other conative attitudes. This chapter also considers the Naturalist Argument for Non-Cognitivism, the Naturalist Argument for Nihilism, and Samuel Blackburn's defence of Quasi-Realism. Finally, it explores the arguments of Quasi-Realists in support of Non-Cognitivist Expressivism.

Keywords:   morality, Non-Cognitivism, Quasi-Realism, normative claims, moral claims, John Hume, moral convictions, Nihilism, Samuel Blackburn, Non-Cognitivist Expressivism

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