Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
On What MattersVolume Two$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 November 2020



(p.488) 32 Epistemology
On What Matters

Samuel Scheffler

Oxford University Press

This chapter looks at epistemology, the Causal Objection, the Validity Argument, and epistemic beliefs. According to the Causal Objection, since non-natural normative properties or truths could not have any effects, we could not have any way of knowing about them. This chapter examines such knowledge from the points of view of Naturalism, Rationalism, and Metaphysical Naturalism. The words ‘probable’, ‘likely’, and ‘certain’ can be used in nonnormative, alethic senses. According to Analytical Naturalism, epistemic normative concepts can be explained in alethic terms, and refer to alethic properties. According to Epistemic Rationalism, these concepts are irreducibly normative, and refer to irreducibly normative properties. According to Non-Analytical Naturalism, although these concepts are irreducibly normative, they refer to alethic properties.

Keywords:   epistemology, Causal Objection, Validity Argument, epistemic beliefs, Naturalism, Rationalism, Metaphysical Naturalism, Analytical Naturalism, Epistemic Rationalism, Non-Analytical Naturalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .