- Title Pages
- About the Editors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 United States—Deconstructing the FCPA
- 2 Australia
- 3 Brazil
- 4 Canada
- 5 China
- 6 Cuba
- 7 France
- 8 Germany
- 9 Guatemala
- 10 India
- 11 Indonesia
- 12 Mexico
- 13 Russia
- 14 South Africa
- 15 Tunisia
- 16 The United Arab Emirates
- 17 United Kingdom
- 18 “Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- 19 The Delicate Task: Guide to Investigating Allegations of Company-Internal Misconduct
- 20 The Key Tools of the Trade in Transnational Bribery Investigations and Prosecutions: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Letters Rogatory
- 21 Global Developments in, and Evolution of, Third-Party Due Diligence
- 22 Investigations, Privacy and Data Security Issues
- 23 Increasing Accountability and Reducing Corruption: the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption System
- 24 Corporate Monitors and the Monitorship Process
- 25 Voluntary Disclosures
- 26 Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Nonprosecution Agreements, and Corporate Integrity Agreements
- 27 Company Cooperation and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
- 28 Department of Justice’s New Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
- 29 On the Anti-Bribery “Watchlist”: Compliance and Labor/Anti-Trafficking Issues
- Conclusion
- Appendix A The 2018 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix
- Appendix B 9-47.000—Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
- Index
Germany
Germany
- Chapter:
- 8 Germany
- Source:
- From Baksheesh to Bribery
- Author(s):
Andrew Boutros
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
Germany is currently ranked among the top 12 in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The country achieved this ranking through substantial efforts in the last decades in legislation, in society, and in the business sector. Today, the corporate compliance management systems of many major German corporations serve as a benchmark in the corporate world. But there is still a lot of work to do. Germany does not yet have a corporate criminal code that holds legal entities criminally liable for corruption-related offenses. German authorities still do not have a uniform and standardized procedure for acknowledging adequate compliance management systems as an affirmative defense or mitigating factor to decrease administrative fines. Although repeatedly requested by the OECD, Germany also still lacks an express and explicit law that grants specific protection to whistle-blowers from retaliation in the private sector, though many German corporations have already set up highly sophisticated whistle-blower systems. This chapter provides an overview on the most important statutory provisions and draft bills with regard to anti-corruption in Germany. Further, the chapter discusses how companies in Germany can take appropriate measures in order to navigate safely through the challenges of corruption-related liability in today’s competitive business environment.
Keywords: Corporate Criminal Code, Verbandsstrafrecht, German Criminal Code, Strafgesetzbuch, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, IDW PS 980, whistle-blower system, Hinweisgebersystem
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- About the Editors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 United States—Deconstructing the FCPA
- 2 Australia
- 3 Brazil
- 4 Canada
- 5 China
- 6 Cuba
- 7 France
- 8 Germany
- 9 Guatemala
- 10 India
- 11 Indonesia
- 12 Mexico
- 13 Russia
- 14 South Africa
- 15 Tunisia
- 16 The United Arab Emirates
- 17 United Kingdom
- 18 “Carbon-Copy Prosecutions”: A Multi-Dimensional Enforcement Paradigm that is Here to Stay
- 19 The Delicate Task: Guide to Investigating Allegations of Company-Internal Misconduct
- 20 The Key Tools of the Trade in Transnational Bribery Investigations and Prosecutions: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Letters Rogatory
- 21 Global Developments in, and Evolution of, Third-Party Due Diligence
- 22 Investigations, Privacy and Data Security Issues
- 23 Increasing Accountability and Reducing Corruption: the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption System
- 24 Corporate Monitors and the Monitorship Process
- 25 Voluntary Disclosures
- 26 Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Nonprosecution Agreements, and Corporate Integrity Agreements
- 27 Company Cooperation and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
- 28 Department of Justice’s New Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
- 29 On the Anti-Bribery “Watchlist”: Compliance and Labor/Anti-Trafficking Issues
- Conclusion
- Appendix A The 2018 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix
- Appendix B 9-47.000—Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
- Index