Haslanger’s Reply to Glasgow, Jeffers, and Spencer
Haslanger’s Reply to Glasgow, Jeffers, and Spencer
The concept of race has a troublesome history. It has been used to divide societies and subordinate groups in unjust ways. It has also been a source of pride and strength for the subordinate (as well as, unfortunately, for the dominant). Historically it has also carried assumptions of naturalness: races are natural kinds that exist independent of human thought and activity. In recent years, however, the naturalness of race has been challenged and replaced with the idea that race is socially constructed. This raises many important philosophical questions: How should one inquire into the concept of race when there is such broad controversy over what race is? What are the relevant phenomena to be considered? How should this inquiry take into account the social stakes, e.g. the potential impact of maintaining or rejecting the concept of race? Is it possible for concepts to evolve, or is conceptual replacement the only option? In Chapter 1, the author took up these methodological questions and positioned herself as a critical theorist considering what role the concept of race has in the social-political domain. Here she argues that there is a meaningful political conception of race that is important in order to address the history of racial injustice. This is compatible with there being different conceptions of race that are valuable in other contexts and for different purposes, e.g. for medical research, cultural empowerment. She argues that, although on this conception race is socially constructed, the resulting notion has a claim to being “our” concept of race.
Keywords: race, racism, social construction, critical theory, conceptual amelioration, conceptual engineering, conceptual pragmatism, racial justice
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