Non-Epistemic Simplicity
Non-Epistemic Simplicity
Maxwell, Newton, and Speculation
This chapter examines five claims about simplicity: (i) that theories are underdetermined by evidence, and so must be selected on the basis of simplicity; (ii) that to do science you must presuppose that nature is simple; (iii) that it is the aim of science to present simple theories; (iv) that simplicity, like beauty, is a virtue worth having for its own sake; and (v) that simplicity is primarily a pragmatic virtue. Objections are raised either refuting or seriously weakening the first four claims. The fifth claim, the pragmatic one, is defended and illustrated by showing how James Clerk Maxwell employs simplicity pragmatically in his molecular theory of gases. It is also shown that, despite what Newton claims when he invokes epistemic simplicity in his argument for universal gravity, simplicity does no epistemic work for him. Despite what he claimed, his law was a speculation.
Keywords: Maxwell, Newton, pragmatic, simplicity, speculation, underdetermination, universal gravity
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
