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Neurointerventions and the LawRegulating Human Mental Capacity$
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Nicole A Vincent, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Allan McCay

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780190651145

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190651145.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 March 2021

Folk Jurisprudence and Neurointervention

Folk Jurisprudence and Neurointervention

An Interdisciplinary Investigation

Chapter:
(p.191) 9 Folk Jurisprudence and Neurointervention
Source:
Neurointerventions and the Law
Author(s):

Thomas Nadelhoffer

Daniela Goya-Tocchetto

Jennifer Cole Wright

Quinn McGuire

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190651145.003.0009

Our chapter is motivated by an underlying assumption that layperson’s intuitions, beliefs, and judgments about moral and legal issues and public policy—which we refer to as “folk jurisprudence”—is relevant to philosophical and legal theorizing about the normative status of the use of neurological interventions. While we are quick to acknowledge that researchers need not be entirely beholden to the dictates of folk jurisprudence, we nevertheless believe that layperson’s attitudes about the relationship between neuroscience and the law ought to at least serve as feasibility constraints when it comes to the important project of getting from theory to practice. Given our beliefs concerning the relevance of folk intuitions to philosophical theorizing and public policy, we set out to explore these intuitions in a systematic way. So, we present the findings from three studies we ran which investigated people’s intuitions about the following practices and policies: (a) using interventions to reduce implicit bias in judges and jurors, (b) using interventions to reduce violence impulsivity on violent offenders, and (c) using interventions to improve moral behavior not only in prison populations but also in the general population. Having presented our findings, we then discuss what we take to be the relevance of this type of research to philosophy, law, and public policy.

Keywords:   folk intuitions, public opinion, criminal law, neurointerventions, competency, experimental philosophy

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