- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- 1 Rescuing and Rearming the USSR's Allies in June 1967
- 2 Holding the Line on the Suez Canal
- 3 The Soviet Presence is Formalized and Expanded
- 4 Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy
- 5 The Nuclear Non-Issue
- 6 “Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes”
- 7 Facing the Bar-Lev Line
- 8 A New Phase from March ’69?
- 9 What Triggered <i>Kavkaz</i>? Refuting Heikal’s Version
- 10 Dr Chazov’s “Vacation in Egypt”
- 11 The Soviet Regulars Move In
- 12 Operation <i>Kavkaz</i> is Formally Organized
- 13 The Soviet–Israeli Battle is Joined
- 14 “A Famous Indiscretion” as the Air War Peaks
- 15 An Mia Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods
- 16 SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle
- 17 Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain
- 18 Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty
- 19 Return of the Foxbats
- 20 Trial Balloons from Both Sides
- 21 Flexing Muscles While Offering a Pullback
- 22 Jockeying and Posturing
- 23 The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth
- 24 Withdrawn Regulars Conceal “Banished” Advisers
- 25 Deception-on-Nile, July 1972
- 26 The Soviets “Return” in October
- Part 4 “We Prepared the War”
- 27 “We Can’t Control the Arabs but Must Support Them”
- 28 “We Will be Two Ismails”
- 29 The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan
- 30 In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War
- 31 The Soviet Nuclear Threat and KISSINGER’S Defcon-3
- Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
The Soviet Presence is Formalized and Expanded
The Soviet Presence is Formalized and Expanded
- Chapter:
- (p.33) 3 The Soviet Presence is Formalized and Expanded
- Source:
- The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973
- Author(s):
Isabella Ginor
Gideon Remez
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
Lieutenant-General Petr Lashchenko, the ranking member of Zakharov’s delegation, remained in Egypt as the chief Soviet military adviser and “commander of the Soviet Forces Group.” While constructing the Egyptian defense line along the Suez Canal and overseeing rehabilitation of Egyptian units to Soviet standards, he negotiated the upgrade of Soviet “experts” to “advisers” with quasi-command authority. Resistance within the Egyptian military ended with the arrest and reported suicide of Abdel Hakim Amer, the commander-in-chief in the June war. On the day the agreement was signed, with hundreds of Soviet advisers arriving in Egypt, the Soviets were involved in the sinking off Port Said of the Israeli destroyer Eilat – the first sinking of a warship by missile. Soviet air advisers established a de facto air base at Cairo-West and began flying sorties opposite Israeli planes, for now undetected.
Keywords: Petr Lashchenko, Sergey Vinogradov, Sergey Sokolov, Evgeny Malashenko, Israeli Destroyer Eilat, Naval missiles, Alexandria, Port Said, Cairo West airbase, Tu 16 bomber
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- 1 Rescuing and Rearming the USSR's Allies in June 1967
- 2 Holding the Line on the Suez Canal
- 3 The Soviet Presence is Formalized and Expanded
- 4 Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy
- 5 The Nuclear Non-Issue
- 6 “Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes”
- 7 Facing the Bar-Lev Line
- 8 A New Phase from March ’69?
- 9 What Triggered <i>Kavkaz</i>? Refuting Heikal’s Version
- 10 Dr Chazov’s “Vacation in Egypt”
- 11 The Soviet Regulars Move In
- 12 Operation <i>Kavkaz</i> is Formally Organized
- 13 The Soviet–Israeli Battle is Joined
- 14 “A Famous Indiscretion” as the Air War Peaks
- 15 An Mia Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods
- 16 SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle
- 17 Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain
- 18 Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty
- 19 Return of the Foxbats
- 20 Trial Balloons from Both Sides
- 21 Flexing Muscles While Offering a Pullback
- 22 Jockeying and Posturing
- 23 The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth
- 24 Withdrawn Regulars Conceal “Banished” Advisers
- 25 Deception-on-Nile, July 1972
- 26 The Soviets “Return” in October
- Part 4 “We Prepared the War”
- 27 “We Can’t Control the Arabs but Must Support Them”
- 28 “We Will be Two Ismails”
- 29 The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan
- 30 In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War
- 31 The Soviet Nuclear Threat and KISSINGER’S Defcon-3
- Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
