- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
The General Argument from Intuition
The General Argument from Intuition
- Chapter:
- (Q) The General Argument from Intuition
- Source:
- Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
- Author(s):
Robert C. Koons
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
Argument Q, the seventeenth argument in Plantinga’s battery, concerns the problem of explaining how we can take seriously our capacity for intuition in such areas as logic, arithmetic, morality, and philosophy. This argument involves a comparison between theistic and non-theistic accounts of these cognitive capacities of human beings. The argument can take three forms: an inference to the best explanation, an appeal to something like the causal theory of knowledge, and an argument turning on the potential threat of undercutting epistemic defeaters concerning the reliability of intuition. All three support the conclusion that we can have intuitive knowledge only if the reliability of that intuition is adequately grounded, as it can be by God’s creation of us.
Keywords: intuition, defeaters, reliability, natural selection, evolutionary debunking, naturalism, theism, counterfactual conditional, necessary truth, concept possession
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
