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Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
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Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

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Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)

Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)

An Abductive Moral Argument for God

(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God

David Baggett

Oxford University Press

This chapter quickly summarizes the contours of an abductive moral argument for God’s existence. The specific moral phenomenon in question here is moral duty or obligation, Plantinga’s preferred variant for this sort of argument, considering it to be the moral fact most resistant to naturalistic analysis. Noting the distinctive features of moral obligations without domesticating or watering them down enables one to see that the best explanation needs to be more robust than what naturalistic sources alone are likely to generate. The chapter gives two versions of the argument, the deductive version and the abductive version, an inference to the best explanation. It will be asserted that the second formulation, in particular, constitutes a formidable challenge for the skeptic about God’s existence.

Keywords:   moral duty, moral obligation, abduction, inference to best explanation, moral argument, authority, prescriptivity, objectivity

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