- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment
The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment
The Theistic Argument from Beauty and Play
- Chapter:
- (U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment
- Source:
- Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
- Author(s):
Philip Tallon
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
Many atheistic philosophers concede that the prevalence of natural beauty is much more likely on theism than on naturalism. It is fairly easy to argue that beauty counts as evidence for God's existence. But how strong is this evidence? And what account of beauty are we using? This chapter examines several versions of the argument from beauty for God's existence, evaluates them, and presents a modified version of the argument offered by Alvin Plantinga. The chapter contends that beauty, as well as play, fit into the picture of Christian theology, and do not fit well within naturalism. An open-minded investigator should infer that Christian theism provides the best explanation for them, and that Christianity provides the best hope for satisfying our desire for beauty and play. In addition, the chapter offers a brief appraisal of Plantinga’s argument from play, and attempts to further it.
Keywords: beauty, naturalism, Plantinga, play, Christianity, Swinburne, theism, Wynn
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- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
