- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia
C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia
A New Argument from Desire
- Chapter:
- (X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia
- Source:
- Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
- Author(s):
Todd Buras
Michael Cantrell
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter shows that in certain circumstances desires are a guide to possibility, and that, in these circumstances, human beings desire at least one state of affairs for which the existence of God is a necessary condition. It follows that God’s existence is possible; or, more modestly, anyone with the relevant desires has a reason to believe God’s existence is possible. Thus, a new argument in the tradition of C.S. Lewis’s argument from nostalgia is offered, an argument from certain desires to the possibility premise of the modal ontological argument. It is argued, further, that support for the possibility premise does not succumb to the problem of equipollence, a problem that undermines many attempts to support the possibility premise.
Keywords: desire, possibility, God, ontological argument, Happiness, Conceivability, problem of equipollence, Atheism
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- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
