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Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
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Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

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The Argument from Possibility

The Argument from Possibility

The Argument from Possibility
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God

Brian Leftow

Oxford University Press

This chapter sketches an argument from the metaphysics of possibility to the existence of something that looks very like God. The argument concerns what is called broadly logical, metaphysical, or absolute possibility. The argument begins by contending that the best theory of this places the truth-makers of absolute possibility claims in the powers of actual existing concrete things: this, it contends, provides the most parsimonious metaphysics of possibility. It shows this inter alia by quick comparison with Meinongian, Platonist and David Lewis’ views. The argument leads to something resembling God: an omnipotent, necessarily existing rational agent. The chapter outlines three factors that lead one to ascribe a mind to this necessary being. It would be less strange to us if it had a mind. This provides the overall most adequate “powers” theory of possibility. And it alone seems to let this being provide the possibility that other beings act with libertarian freedom.

Keywords:   metaphysics, possibility, God, powers, Platonism, David Lewis, Meinongianism

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