- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- (A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness)
- (B) The Argument from Collections
- (C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers
- (D) The Argument from Counterfactuals
- (E) The Argument from Physical Constants
- (F) The Naïve Teleological Argument
- (H) The Ontological Argument
- (I) Why Is There Anything at All?
- (J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status
- (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability
- (L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction
- (N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability]
- (N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus
- (Q) The General Argument from Intuition
- (R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)
- (R*)The Argument from Evil
- (S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors
- (T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life
- (U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment
- (W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles
- (X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia
- (Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y)
- The <i>Kalam</i> Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
- Afterword*
- Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments”
- Index
The Argument from Possibility
The Argument from Possibility
- Chapter:
- The Argument from Possibility
- Source:
- Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
- Author(s):
Brian Leftow
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter sketches an argument from the metaphysics of possibility to the existence of something that looks very like God. The argument concerns what is called broadly logical, metaphysical, or absolute possibility. The argument begins by contending that the best theory of this places the truth-makers of absolute possibility claims in the powers of actual existing concrete things: this, it contends, provides the most parsimonious metaphysics of possibility. It shows this inter alia by quick comparison with Meinongian, Platonist and David Lewis’ views. The argument leads to something resembling God: an omnipotent, necessarily existing rational agent. The chapter outlines three factors that lead one to ascribe a mind to this necessary being. It would be less strange to us if it had a mind. This provides the overall most adequate “powers” theory of possibility. And it alone seems to let this being provide the possibility that other beings act with libertarian freedom.
Keywords: metaphysics, possibility, God, powers, Platonism, David Lewis, Meinongianism
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- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- (A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness)
- (B) The Argument from Collections
- (C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers
- (D) The Argument from Counterfactuals
- (E) The Argument from Physical Constants
- (F) The Naïve Teleological Argument
- (H) The Ontological Argument
- (I) Why Is There Anything at All?
- (J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status
- (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability
- (L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction
- (N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability]
- (N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus
- (Q) The General Argument from Intuition
- (R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn)
- (R*)The Argument from Evil
- (S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors
- (T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life
- (U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment
- (W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles
- (X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia
- (Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y)
- The <i>Kalam</i> Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
- Afterword*
- Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments”
- Index
