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Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
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Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

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The Argument from Counterfactuals

The Argument from Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals, Vagueness, and God

(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God

Alexander R. Pruss

Oxford University Press

It seems that counterfactuals and many other statements are subject to semantic underdetermination. Classical logic pushes one to an epistemicist account of this underdetermination, but epistemicism seems implausible. However epistemicism can be made plausible when conjoined with a divine institution account of meaning. This gives us some reason to accept that divine institution account, and hence some reason to think that God exists. This chapter evaluates the arguments for epistemicism and divine institution, including objections, and incorporates Plantinga’s consideration of counterfactuals when it comes to theism. In particular, an analogy is drawn with divine command and natural law theories in ethics.

Keywords:   counterfactuals, epistemicism, meaning, semantic underdetermination, divine command theory

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