- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
The Naïve Teleological Argument
The Naïve Teleological Argument
An Argument from Design for Ordinary People
- Chapter:
- (F) The Naïve Teleological Argument
- Source:
- Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God
- Author(s):
C. Stephen Evans
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter considers an argument from design, meant for those without a technical scientific background, and based on Thomas Reid’s concept of natural signs. For Reid, sensations function as natural signs in perception when some object in the world causes sensations, on the basis of which one is disposed to form beliefs and concepts about those objects. This establishes direct, non-inferential knowledge of what we perceive. If God exists, it is plausible that He would make himself known by means of natural signs. One kind of natural sign would be the perceived design in nature. According to both externalist and internalist accounts of knowledge, natural signs of God offer justification for a person to believe in God. The justification could be non-inferential but the sign could also be the basis of an argument of the type explained in this chapter. The chapter ends by responding to an objection from evolution against apparent design.
Keywords: argument from design, Thomas Reid, evolution, perception, natural signs, justification
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- Title Pages
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
(A) The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness) -
(B) The Argument from Collections -
(C) The Argument from (Natural) Numbers -
(D) The Argument from Counterfactuals -
(E) The Argument from Physical Constants -
(F) The Naïve Teleological Argument -
(H) The Ontological Argument -
(I) Why Is There Anything at All? -
(J) The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status -
(K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability -
(L) The Argument from Simplicity and (M) The Argument from Induction -
(N) The Putnamian Argument (the Argument from the Rejection of Global Skepticism) [also, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (K) The Argument from the Confluence of Proper Function and Reliability] -
(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus -
(Q) The General Argument from Intuition -
(R) Moral Arguments (actually R1 to Rn) - (R*)The Argument from Evil
-
(S) The Argument from Colors and Flavors -
(T) The Argument from Love and (Y) The Argument from the Meaning of Life -
(U) The Mozart Argument and (V) The Argument from Play and Enjoyment -
(W) Arguments from Providence and from Miracles -
(X) C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia -
(Z) The Argument from (A) to (Y) - The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- The Argument from Possibility
- The Necessity of Sufficiency
-
Afterword
* -
Appendix Plantinga’s Original “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” - Index
