Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for GodThe Plantinga Project$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190842215

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2021

Why Is There Anything at All?

Why Is There Anything at All?

(I) Why Is There Anything at All?
Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God

Joshua Rasmussen

Christopher Gregory Weaver

Oxford University Press

This chapter marks out a two-stage argument from contingency for a maximally great being. In the first stage, the authors support premises in a modal cosmological argument for a Necessary Foundation of contingent things. The discussion ends with an examination of objections to this idea. In the second stage, it is argued from “modal continuity” that this Necessary Foundation would be maximal with respect to its causal capacities and other basic attributes. The authors suggest that if their argument is sound, then the best explanation of why there is anything is ultimately in terms of a maximally great, necessary being. A key aspect of the chapter’s argument is that the totality of necessary concrete reality cannot have arbitrary non-maximal limits with respect to its basic, uncaused attributes.

Keywords:   cosmological argument, necessary being, modal argument, maximally great being, argument from contingency

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .