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Can Animals Be Persons?$
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Mark Rowlands

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780190846039

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190846039.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 August 2021

Pre-Intentional Awareness of Self

Pre-Intentional Awareness of Self

(p.127) 7 Pre-Intentional Awareness of Self
Can Animals Be Persons?

Mark Rowlands

Oxford University Press

In pre-intentional self-awareness, a person is self-aware without making herself into an object of any intentional act. The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is examined through a historical lens provided by Kant and Sartre. The idea is further developed analytically. A perceived object is always perceived as something. This occurs because a series of anticipations are generated in the perceiver. The perceiver is implicated in many of these anticipations. In perceiving an object, therefore, the perceiver is pre-intentionally self-aware. A de-intellectualized way of understanding pre-intentional self-awareness is identified and defended. Pre-intentional self-awareness attaches to the possession of conscious experiences. To the extent animals have conscious experiences, therefore, they will, thereby, be pre-intentionally self-aware. Pre-intentional self-awareness is likely to be widely distributed through the animal kingdom.

Keywords:   Kant, enactivism, pre-intentional self-awareness, phenomenology, Sartre

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