The final chapter concludes our use of Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to ponder the moral domain and explore growth beyond the superficial in morality. We recap our critique of Haidt’s theory. We culminate our argument for a coprimacy in moral motivation by relating Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to motivationally and qualitatively distinct categories of knowledge (logico-mathematical, empirical). We relate logical-moral ideals to an analysis of adaptation and evolution (Piaget, Singer) that is less reductionistic than the pragmatic version offered by Haidt and others. We conclude with some final thoughts on moral development, perception, and behavior vis-à-vis a deeper reality of human connection.
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