- Title Pages
- Notes on Contributing Authors
- Chapter 1 Taxation and Human Rights
- Chapter 2 Taxing for the Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
- Chapter 3 Taxation as a Human Rights Issue
- Chapter 4 Tax and Human Rights
- Chapter 5 The Search for Human Rights in Tax
- Chapter 6 Procuring Profit Shifting
- Chapter 7 A Strange Alchemy
- Chapter 8 Tax Abuse and Implications for Human Rights in Africa
- Chapter 9 Some Aspects of the Architecture of International Tax Reform (and Their Human Rights–Related Consequences)
- Chapter 10 Transparency, Tax, and Human Rights
- Chapter 11 Taxation and Human Rights
- Chapter 12 Corporate Tax Privacy and Human Rights
- Chapter 13 How Countries Should Share Tax Information
- Chapter 14 United States’ Responsibility to Promote Financial Transparency
- Chapter 15 Interrogating the Relationship between “Legally Defensible” Tax Planning and Social Justice
- Chapter 16 Who’s to Blame for the Money Drain? Corporate Power and Corruption as Competing Narratives for Lost Resources
- Chapter 17 Creating a Human Rights Framework for Mapping and Addressing Corporate Tax Abuses
- Chapter 18 ECHR Litigation as a Tool for Tax Justice in Europe
- Chapter 19 “Taxing for Growth” vs. “Taxing for Equality”—Using Human Rights to Combat Gender Inequalities, Poverty, and Income Inequalities in Fiscal Laws
- Chapter 20 Human Rights and the Taxation of Menstrual Hygiene Products in an Unequal World
- Chapter 21 Recent Cases of Regressive and Racially Disparate Taxation in the United States
- Chapter 22 Labor, Capital, and Human Rights
- Chapter 23 Inequality, Taxation, and Public Transfers in Latin America
- Chapter 24 Basic Income as a Human Right?
- Chapter 25 Taxation, Human Rights, and a Universal Basic Income
Basic Income as a Human Right?
Basic Income as a Human Right?
- (p.541) Chapter 24 Basic Income as a Human Right?
- Tax, Inequality, and Human Rights
Daniel J. Hemel
- Oxford University Press
This chapter suggests a human rights–based justification for national basic income schemes, contrasting it with justifications based on welfarist principles or notions of entitlement to a share of the global commons. Starting from the premise that a state is a collective enterprise that generates a surplus, it contends that any human being who is an “obedient” member of that state has a right to some share of the surplus. That right—which arises from the relationship between the individual and the state, and is independent of need—could justify the entitlement to a basic income. Such income should be provided in cash, not in kind, because the latter risks depriving the individual of the enjoyment of his share of the surplus—in effect, forcing him to forfeit or transfer it to others if he does not use the public goods or services provided by the state.
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