India’s Unique Approach to Jointness
This chapter examines jointness—defined as the ability of the three services (army, air force, and navy) to operate together. It is informed by the widely held assumptions that jointness enhances military effectiveness but also requires civilian intervention. It chiefly argues that the single-service approach is still prevalent in India and that there has been an “incomplete transition” to jointness. This is primarily because of a lack of forceful and informed civilian intervention. The absent dialogue perfectly describes civil–military interaction on this issue. While making these claims, the chapter examines jointness in five major wars—the 1962 China war, the 1965 and 1971 India–Pakistan wars, the military intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, and the 1999 Kargil war. It concludes by explaining why civilians have not intervened more forcefully on this issue.
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